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VOL. XXxii DECEMBER, 1956 NO. 1
THE INTEGRATED COMPANY AND THE PRICE
SQUEEZE UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT AND SEC-
TION 2 (a) OF THE CLAYTON ACT, AS AMENDED*
INTRODUCTION
The subject assigned for this paper was, generally, buy-
ing and selling for the corporate family. This covers a very
considerable amount of territory. If one could encompass
all the problems, to say nothing of their solution, in a
matter of thirty minutes, I suspect there would be many
fewer antitrust lawyers and a much happier business com-
munity. Because my first loyalty is to my profession, I will
make no attempt to accomplish any such drastic end.'
The term "corporate family" suggests a natural limita-
tion of subject matter. My Webster's dictionary defines
"family" as "[a] group of closely related individuals...,"
* This article was first presented as an address before the Section on
Antitrust of the American Bar Association, August 28, 1956, in Dallas, Texas.
1 Even with the valuable assistance of two fellow lawyers, George N.
Tompkins, Jr., and Khalil Sfer, to whom I am very grateful.
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hence, a plurality of persons. Therefore, it is appropriate to
confine this paper to problems flowing from and peculiar
to the operation under single management of a plurality of
separately identifiable economic functions, loosely termed
an integrated company. The subject has been further prun-
ed down-arbitrarily-to a major pricing problem gen-
erally peculiar to such a business entity. That is the
problem of how much attention an integrated company
need pay to the relationships between its prices at different
vertical levels or in different geographical areas. There
are circumstances where these relationships may give
rise to what has been termed the "Price Squeeze,"2
either on competitors of the integrated company at some
level of its operations or on competitors of customers of
such a company, which may have antitrust significance.
More specifically I will discuss the following:
1. Why a "squeeze" on competitors by an integrated
company is considered an unfair and sometimes unlawful
practice.
2. Squeezing competitors under the Sherman Act 3 -the
implications of price relationships and resulting relative
profitability among different functions of the integrated
enterprise.
3. Squeezing competitors or competitors of customers-
the dilemma of Standard Oil of Indiana.
4. A possible new governmental implement for attack-
ing the squeeze-may subsidiaries or divisions be consider-
ed purchasers for the purpose of establishing a price
discrimination under section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act, as
amended?4
2 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 436 (2d Cir.
1945).
3 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. III 1956).
4 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952).
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THE SQUEEZE AS AN UNFAIR AND
SOMETIMES UNLAWFUL PRACTICE
No citation of authority is necessary for the bald propo-
sition that integration-and the term is used herein to
include any business entity which is carrying on two or
more separately identifiable economic functions-is not
unlawful per se.' It is equally clear that basic antitrust
policy requires the exercise of economic power flowing
from integration with the utmost circumspection.
Any integrated company has, in addition to the problem
of actively competing in accordance with the dictates of
fundamental antitrust policy, the infinitely more difficult
problem of avoiding a use of advantages flowing from its
multifunction position to the detriment of competitors, per-
forming fewer functions or a single function, in such a
manner that any such use may be termed a predatory
practice.
There are many contexts in which this has arisen in the
decided cases. By way of illustration, an automobile manu-
facturer which also ran a finance company contravened the
antitrust laws when it used its control over the supply of
automobiles to induce its dealers to use the services of its
finance company to the detriment of other finance com-
panies.' The owner of a chain of motion picture theaters
likewise ran into difficulty when it used its mass buying
power to secure blanket first run privileges for gubstantial-
ly all its theaters to the detriment of other competing
theater owners.7 The manufacturer of a patented salt dis-
5 Nevertheless, see United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 525
(1948).
6 United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
7 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
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pensing machine found itself in trouble when it used its
patent control to attempt to force the use of only its salt in
its patented machines.' Through these cases, and many
more, runs the basic thread of judicial insulation of the less
advantageously situated competitor from the full rigors of
the law of the competitive jungle.
One advantage an integrated company has over its non or
less integrated competitors is simply that it has more "irons
in the fire." It can afford to make less profit at some levels
or in some geographical regions than in others and still,
perhaps, achieve an overall return on capital' satisfactory
to it. To the extent it can control its pricing destiny, it also
has more flexibility in operation.
To what extent can this flexibility be consciously used?
Or, putting it another way, what inferences may be drawn
from varying levels of profits in different functions of an
integrated business or from different prices in different
areas?
The present day view of this situation has its roots in the
common law, which considered it a tort deliberately to
destroy another's business, inter alia, by selling or offering
to sell at unreasonably low prices.' The gravamen of the
offense was the intent to destroy.
The original Clayton Act' incorporated this theory in
part but slightly changed the nature of the wrong. For
deliberate intent to destroy a competitor it substituted
discriminations in price where the effect might be "to sub-
stantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in any line.of commerce." The addition of the requirement
of a discrimination in price introduced explicitly the idea
that the wrong stemmed from the use of superior economic
power, the ability to sell to some customers or in some
S FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
9 See Boggs v. Duncan-Schell Furniture Co., 163 Iowa 106, 143 N.W.
482 (1913).
10 38 STAT. 730 (1914).
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areas at a higher price than to other customers or in other
areas-an ability which may be possessed by the integrated
company. The leading case under that statute on this par-
ticular point, Porto Rican Am. Tobacco Co. v. American
Tobacco Co.," still, however, seemed to turn on deliberate
and explicit intent to destroy a competitor; similarly with
E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC,' decided under section 2 (a) of
the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson Patman Act.'"
Even in the much criticized Moss case '1 there were find-
ings by the FTC of sales below cost with the result that
one competitor was driven out of business. 5 That "sleep-
er," section 3 of the Robinson Patman Act,'" makes it a
crime to sell at lower prices in one part of the country than
in another only where it is for the purpose of "destroying
competition or eliminating a competitor" or to "sell, or
contract to sell, goods atunreasonably low prices" only
where it is for the same purpose. And the Mead case,' 7 de-
cided under this statute, could very reasonably be said to
turn on the same point, i. e., deliberate intent to destroy a
competitor.
In this process, however, there came to be a sensitivity
to any suggestion that variations in prices or "profits" in
": 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 858 (1929).
32 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944).
'3 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952). The Muller case is
based in part upon the language, ". . . to injure, destroy, or prevent com-
petition with any person who ... grants ... the benefit of such discrimina-
tion.. " which did not appear in the original Clayton Act.
14 Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 734 (1945). See, for criticism of its holding that requisite injury could
be inferred from mere differences in price, ATromEy GENERAs'S NATIONAL
CoMUr=r TO STUDY THE Awr-TRusT LAws, REPORT at 161-166 (1955).
15 36 F.T.C. 640, 647-648 (1943).
16 49 STAT. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (a) (1952). The Attorney General's
Committee has recommended this be repealed. See ATorY GEumAL's NA-
TiONAL Co=TrE, op. cit. supra note 14, at 198-201. See also, Dillon, Crimi-
nal Penalties in Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act (Borah-Van Nuys
Act); "Dead Horse" or "Sleeper"? A.B.A., REPORT, SECTION OF ANTTRUST LAW
112 (April 1956).
17 Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
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different elements of the integrated company were having
adverse effects on less or non-integrated competitors re-
gardless of any specific intent to destroy a competitor's
business. By virtue of integration a company may have, as
Corwin Edwards has put it, "the power to squeeze" its
competitors."8 The very word "squeezing" suggests unfair-
ness. It is done, as the Department of Justice has put it in
one case, 9 by "subsidization" of one function by profits
from another. "Subsidization" is a label which implies "in-
sulation from competition in some areas."" Or, as another
writer has put it, "losses" in one segment are made up by
"profits" in another,2 thus inferentially equating what
may be a result of differing competitive conditions in dif-
ferent markets to a practice outlawed in many states, of
deliberately selling particular products at a price below
cost-of being the loss leader.22
Complaints concerning integration based in part on the
ability of the integrated company to "subsidize" one func-
tion by "profits" from another have come largely from
wholesalers and retailers, and Congress has always lent a
sympathetic ear. Recently such complaints have, in part,
produced the introduction of bills in Congress intended to
exclude manufacturing or refining companies from retail
activities in particular industries such as tires23 and petro-
leum. 4 One recent bill would have excluded all manufac-
18 EDWARDS, MAIAINING COMPETITION 98 (1949).
19 United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Co. 173 F2d 79 (7th
Cir. 1949), supplemental brief for the United States, p. 36.
20 DmLAm AND KAHN, FAIm ComprTTON 215 (1954).
21 COOK, CONTROL OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY BY MiAJOR OIL COMPANIES
22 (TNEC Monograph No. 39, 1941).
22 See, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 17044 (Deering 1951).
23 E.g. S. 175 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), introduced by Senator Mur-
ray.
24 E.g. S. 572, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. (1949), introduced by Senator Gil-
lette.
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turers from retail marketing.' The most recent of these,
aimed at partial divorcement in the petroleum industry,
introduced by Representative Roosevelt on July 23, 1956,26
states that the evil to be corrected stems from the "ability
[of the 'producer'] to operate retail gasoline stations at
less than cost by subsidizing their retail operations from
profits made in other activities .... It is therefore the pur-
pose of this Act... to restore... unsubsidized competition
in gasoline and other petroleum products...
II
SQUEEZING COMPETITORS UNDER THE
SHERMAN ACT
In two Sherman Act cases it has been made clear that in
some circumstances at least, the integrated company can-
not safely consider only its overall return on capital and
ignore in its pricing, at different levels or in different
regions, the resultant profitability of its different functions.
In both Alcoa28 and A & P' the fact of varying degrees of
profitability in different functions played significant roles
in a finding of violation where there was an impact on
competitors.
25 S. 141, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), introduced by Senator Langer.
The concern with protecting small business is expressed in the preamble:
"In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress . . . to uphold the
place of the small independent businessman in local community life which
has been the mainstay of America."
26 H.R. 12369, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
27 Id. §2. It is to be accomplished by prohibiting a producer who sells
as a wholesaler to independent retailers from engaging in the retail business.
However, the producer who does not sell at wholesale to independents may
still lawfully engage in the retail business.
28 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
29 United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626
(E-D. Ill. 1946), aff'd, 173 F2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
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Alcoa produced and sold virgin aluminum in ingot form.
It also engaged in several fabricating operations, one of
which was rolling the ingot into sheet. It was the sole
domestic producer of virgin aluminum. There were, how-
ever, several other manufacturers of sheet who purchased
ingot from Alcoa and sold the sheet in competition with
Alcoa.
In 1932 the Department of Justice began investigating
complaints from Alcoa's competitive sheet manufacturers
to the effect that the spread between the price of ingot-
set by Alcoa-and the price of sheet, which the court said
Alcoa also set, was not sufficient to permit a very profitable
sheet manufacturing operation. In 1933 Alcoa reduced the
price of ingot and the complaints ceased.
The "squeeze," or "subsidization" of "sheet manufac-
ture" by "profits" from ingot sales, was relied upon heavily
by the Government as proof of intent to monopolize.
This particular situation was considered, to some extent,
in isolation by the court.3 0 Alcoa was making an overall
profit from its operations which Judge Hand, after con-
sidering, did not find unreasonable.31 When, however, he
looked at the "squeeze" he considered only the profit-
ability of the sheet manufacturing operation. He found a
violation of the Sherman Act from the following facts:
Alcoa's own cost of sheet manufacture left a small or non-
existent profit in that operation for Alcoa; Alcoa had
knowledge that this was making it difficult for competitors
to operate; it subsequently reduced the price of ingot which
30 Judge Hand had already held that Alcoa had monopolized the ingot
market in 1940 so it wasn't necessary to consider these practices as evidence
on that point. However, because it appeared that Alcoa's monopoly on ingot
might disappear before a decree was entered, and, therefore, dissolution
might not be required, he wanted to consider whether certain specific
practices were illegal and should be enjoined absent dissolution. 148 F2d
at 432.
31 He considered it irrelevant but did say "... a profit of ten percent,
so conditioned, could hardly be considered extortionate." Id. at 426-427.
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increased the sheet manufacturers' profit margin.3 2
The key factor was Alcoa's operation of its sheet manu-
facturing operation at a level which bordered on a loss, and
Alcoa's protests that it could not tell until the end of an
accounting period whether there would be a profit or a loss
were to no avail.33
Clearly the court considered Alcoa's monopoly power
over the price of ingot as the fountainhead from which its
responsibility for the welfare of its competitors flowed. 4
Sheet manufacturing was "subsidized" by profits from
ingot manufacture, a function "insulated from competi-
tion."
But suppose the function from which the "subsidy" flows
is not a monopoly or near monopoly, but merely less
competitive. And suppose competitors are not dependent
32 Id. at 438. It is there summarized as follows:
"That it was unlawful to set the price of 'sheet' so low and hold
the price of ingot so high, seems to us unquestionable, provided, as
we have held, that on this record the price of ingot must be regarded
as higher than a 'fair price.' True, this -was only a consequence of
'Alcoa's' control over the price of ingot, and perhaps it ought not
to be considered as a separate wrong .... But it was at least an
unlawful exercise of 'Alcoa's' power after it had been put on notice
by the 'sheet rollers" complaints . . . We hold that at least in 1932
it had become a wrong."
The judgment on remand found this a violation not of section 2 but of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
SD.N.Y. Eq. No. 85-75, para. 8 of the final judgment entered April 23, 1946.
33 Id. at 437.
34 The responsibility even in Alcoa did not extend to all competitors.
The Government also charged Alcoa with a similar squeeze on cable
fabrication. There were similar complaints regarding this squeeze which
continued after 1933 when the price of ingot had been reduced. Of this,
Judge Hand said:
"That may be true, but aluminum 'cable' must in any event com-
pete with copper 'cable,' and the plaintiff failed to show that,
even though the price of ingot were reduced so as to realize only
a 'fair' profit, it would have been possible to compete with copper
'cable' and leave an adequate 'spread' for 'cable' fabricators ....
'Alcoa' may have had another intent in selling at a loss than to
monopolize the market, or to suppress competition; and the finding
was that it did." Id. at 438.
For this reason the finding was not disturbed.
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on the integrated company for supplies. This was the
situation in A & P.35
A & P, in the period covered by the information, was
essentially a retailer of food. While it performed a number
of vertical functions, it sold with one exception36 only at
retail. Thus while it operated some food processing plants
and performed wholesale functions for its retail chain, it
only made a dollar and cents profit when the final sale was
made at retail. Its competitors were not dependent on it at
the processing or wholesale levels for supplies and its
prices at those levels were not determinative of competitors
costs as they were in Alcoa.
Moreover, during the period complained of, A & P was
doing an average of less than 10% of the retail food
business in the United States and its position was declining
both in relation to independents and to other chain stores.3
It was, however, the largest food retailer.
The Government did not claim that A & P intended to
secure an absolute monopoly in the retail food business,
nor, indeed, that it aimed at more than 25% of the business
in any particular city."a Nevertheless for an accumulation
of isolated, but highly competitive acts, it was found guilty
of violating section 2 of the Sherman Act.39
35 United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626
(E.D. Ill. 1946), aff'd, 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949). This was a criminal
case brought for violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, tried
before Judge Lindley without a jury. His verdict of guilty was affirmed
by the 7th Circuit.
36 The exception: ACCO, a separate buying organization which sold
some products to A & P's competitors. The volume of these sales was small
compared with A & P's total sales. For discussion of the ACCO phase of
the case, see Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARv. L. Rv.
27, 53-55 (1949) and DnuLAM & KAHN, FAIR Cora'rrnioN 78-80 (1954).
37 According to Judge Lindley, in the period 1933 to 1943, A & P's posi-
tion in the food business was declining from 11.6% to 7.1%. Meanwhile
the independents were increasing from 61.7% to 70.2%, while the position
of chain stores, including A & P, was declining from 38.3% to 29.8%, with
A & P taking over half the loss. 67 F. Supp. at 633. The government con-
tended these were misleading but offered no alternatives.
38 Id. at 641.
39 As well as section 1.
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Essentially the vice in A & P's conduct was overaggres-
siveness. It would not be undersold at retail, and therefore
varied prices from store to store and region to region.
Because A & P's methods resulted in low prices to the
public-and a very modest overall profit to A & P-the
Government had to find an undesirable label for this con-
duct-one which could taint A & P's whole course of doing
business. It did this by suggesting that A & P had used its
integration to squeeze competitors in an unfair manner by
subsidization of one function by another. It was stated in
their brief in the circuit court in this fashion:
.. [F]irst [A & P] have subsidized their total retail op-
erations by crediting non-retail profits to retail opera-
tions.... Second they have sold merchandise in select-
ed retail areas below their actual cost of doing business at
retail in such areas. 40
And in their supplemental brief:
This is subsidization of selected retail areas by other
retail areas. It is an illegal use of horizontal integration,
and hence unlawful.4 '
This seems to have been the key point upon which Judge
Minton decided to uphold the district court. After speaking
of A & P's method for establishing price levels at its differ-
ent stores, he stated:
When the gross profit rate is reduced in Area X, it is an al-
most irresistible conclusion that A & P had the power to
compensate for any possible decline in net profits by rais-
ing the gross profit rate and retail prices in Area Y,
where it was in a competitive position to do so .... There
must inevitably be a compensation somewhere in the sys-
tem for a loss somewhere else, as the overall policy of the
company is to earn $7 per share per annum on its stock.'
This, coupled with A & P's enormous buying advantage,
spelled out a violation.43
40 Brief for the United States, p. 73.
41 Supplemental Brief for the United States, p. 36.
42 173 F.2d at 87.
43 Ibid.
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A & P goes much further than Alcoa. In Alcoa the source
of the subsidy was ingot profits over which Alcoa had an
economic monopoly. In A & P, however, the ability to sub-
sidize in any chosen area came from the fact of wide-
spread geographical distribution of retailing operations, not
from the fact of monopoly control in any area. Did Judge
Minton thereby hold, as the Government contended, that
subsidy of operations in one geographical area by opera-
tions in another is unlawful without more, regardless of
monopoly control in the more profitable one?
When one looks at the retail aspects of the operation
through A & P's glasses rather than the court's, the in-
plications of this decision for all integrated companies are
startling. A & P's company policy was never to drive par-
ticular competitors out of business."' Its policy was merely
to secure a certain volume of business which would give it
a low unit cost of sale.45 A & P never deliberately planned
to operate a store or division at a loss.4" It merely operated
at a small planned gross margin of profit in the hope that
this would produce a sufficient volume to make the op-
eration profitable.
In pricing lower in some areas than in others it was
meeting competition. As one writer has put it after study
of the record:
. .. [M]ost of A & P's retail price differentiation was,
truly, a meeting of competition. Most of the units that ran
at a loss for substantial periods did so in an effort to meet
the far more aggressive competition of local chains and
super markets. Many instances of local price cutting...
44 In the district court opinion two instances are cited where overzealous
A & P employees threatened a particular competitor. In each case manage-
ment intervened and corrected the situation. 67 F. Supp. at 664-671.
45 As John A. Hartford put it in his testimony at trial: 'We thought it
was sounder business to sell two hundred pounds of butter at a cent a
pound profit than one hundred pounds at two cents. That was our theory."
Transcript of Record, p. 122.
46 Contrary to the Government's contention. See Supplemental Brief
for the United States, p. 36. Judge Minton impliedly concedes as much.
173 F.2d at 86-87. For documentation of A & P policy on this point, see
Main Brief for Appellant, pp. 31-35, and Reply Brief for Appellant, p. 12.
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appear to have been in response to the opening ... of
new stores by competitors....47
In both Alcoa and A&P much was made of supposed
operation of particular elements of the business at a "loss."
Although not explicitly stated, "loss" as opposed to some
margin of profit was important.48 This is sound because if it
is to be the law that integrated companies cannot use
profits from one function to subsidize another, or from
one geographical area to subsidize another, where com-
petitors in the latter are hurt, in an imprecise way, the test
becomes whether a competitor can be expected to stay in
business. If one is going to imply an unlawful intent to
"squeeze"-to drive competitors out of business-it should
not be inferred from facts indicating that a competitor can
stay in business.
In both Alcoa and A & P, while there were external
alarms sounded by injured competitors, the ultimate proof
of the "subsidy" came from the books of the defendants.
This suggests that the manner in which a company's books
are kept is of considerable importande.
Modern industrial management seems committed, and
wisely so,' to keeping close track of the profitability of the
47 Which is an "important element in workable competition." Dimam &
KAHN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 212. These authors, however, do not condemn
the result in A & P, seemingly on the theory that A & P was not selective
enough in its response to competition - i.e., it was too willing to take "a
loss" for too long a time. Id. at 214.
48 Judge Hand, for example, made no effort to compare profitability of
sheet manufacture with that of ingot after Alcoa had purged itself of the
squeeze in 1933 by lowering the price of ingot. 148 F.2d at 437-438. It
seemed enough that some profit was possible for efficient competitors.
49 If the comparative experience of Ford and General Motors in the
decade prior to 1947 is any indication. See Adelman, op. cit. supra note 36, at
27, 36. quoting from Fortune, May 1947, p. 84, where it is said:
"Imagine a company that boasted of a higher order of integration
than any similar organization in the country, with ownership of a
steel mill, glass plant, timber stands, maritime fleet, etc., and no
accurate knowledge of which individual operation was paying its
way, or which was padding the cost of the company's end product
by open-market standards.'
By 1946 Ford was losing money and had lost substantial market position.
In contrast, General Motors kept detailed track of the relative rates of
return on each of its activities, operated profitably, and increased its position.
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various functions of its business enterprise. It must know'
whether each function is being operated efficiently and
whether capital is being profitably employed. The best
method for ascertaining this is to treat each function as a
separate business, billing it on the books for materials at
market price and crediting it for its end product in the
same fashion, thus testing its operation where possible by
the market place.
But there are many areas where it is extremely difficult
from an accounting point of view to make an allocation of
cost which accurately' interprets the business reality. It has
been said that:
. ..[D]epending on what system of accountacy is used,
any department of an integrated company can be made to
show a profit .... 50
There are "common costs"-costs fairly allocable to either
of two separate functions-which break down into "joint
costs" (which arise when several products result from a
single process) and "overhead costs."'
Whatever else A & P did wrong, it did itself the greatest
disservice by the "statistical accounting" system it used for
management control purposes.2 This provided the glue
with which the Governm3nt's charges of "subsidy" and
actual operation in particular areas at a "loss" were made
to stick. It arbitrarily minimized retail profits53 and not
50 Fortune, February, 1941, pp. 116-117. This is quoted in Hale, Vertical
Integration, 49 COLJm. L. REv. 921, 941 (1949), which contains an excellent
statement of the accounting problems facing the integrated company as
well as a critical analysis of the "squeeze," "double profits," "subsidiza-
tion," "recoupment," etc.
51 Id. at 941-946.
52 A & P used two parallel record systems. One was a normal account-
ing system used to indicate long term trends and for stockholder and tax
reports. The other was a system of statistical information and reports used
as a management control device. The two were not identical. See Main Brief
for Appellant, pp. 18-29, for a description of these systems.
53 For example: A & P computed its "gross profit rate" for retail op-
erations on basis of the delivered cost of the goods to the store, rather than
on the delivered cost to the warehouse as was the custom of its competitors.
Main Brief for Appellant, p. 24. Thus its gross profit rate was uniformly
smaller.
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only indicated the existence of but magnified the paper
profits from buying operations. Even assuming Judge
Minton understood the statistical accounting system, and
its relationship to A & P's other accounting system, refer-
ence to which was necessary to determine actual profit, the
former left its impression upon him and gave him the basis
for speaking of the "large fund accumulated at the buying
and supplying level" 4 and finding that in some areas a
particular "storeruns below the cost of operation."'
There is no indication in the opinion as to whether the
final result of the normal accounting system of A & P gave
an accurate picture of non or less integrated competitors'
costs in comparable functions. This fact should have been
the crucial question.56
The consent decree entered in the companion civil suit57
brought against A & P would seem to indicate that the
Department has backed away from any rigid requirement
that all A & P stores be operated at a profit. It simply en-
joined planned operation of a "division," which includes
all retail stores in a large geographical area, at so low a
gross profit rate that it is "known" that the result will be
operation of such "division" at a loss, when done for the
purpose of destroying competion. Mere operation of a di-
vision at a loss will not give rise to the presumption of such
purpose.5" Under this decree A & P purposely could operate
54 173 F.2d at 86-87.
55 Ibid.
56 In Alcoa, Judge Hand recognized this by assuming that Alcoa's costs
were fairly representative of its competitors' costs, 148 F.2d at 438; this is
an assumption of questionable soundness in A & P.
57 United States v. Great A & P Tea Co., 1954 Trade Cas., 67,658
(S.D.N.Y. 1954).
58 Ibid. The pertinent provision of the decree is as follows:
"Defendants are jointly and severally restrained and enjoined from as-
signing... a gross profit rate for any Division, knowing that such .. will
result in the operation of any such Division at a loss, for the purpose of or
with the intent of destroying or eliminating competition in the retail pur-
chase, sale or distribution of food or food products.... The purpose or in-
tent prohibited in this Section shall not be presumed merely by reason of
the operation of a Division at a loss."
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some retail stores, the real tactical units in the food mer-
chandising wars, at a loss and, provided the "division"
showed a profit, be in the clear.
A & P thus retains, to a large degree, its flexibility within
its "divisions." In some respects it may, therefore, be con-
siderably better off under the decree than it was before. 9
On the other hand, the decree in Alcoa flatly prohibited
any sale by Alcoa of its sheet at a loss.6
III
SQUEEZING COMPETITORS OR COMPETITORS OF
CUSTOMERS - THE DILEMMA OF STANDARD
OIL OF INDIANA
Standard of Indiana did just the reverse of what Alcoa
was accused of doing.6" It did not "squeeze" its wholesale
customers with whom it competed as a wholesaler in selling
direct to retailers. Rather it maintained too large a spread
between its price to such wholesalers and its price to re-
59 For-the alleged practice of planning particular retail store operations
within a "division" at a "loss" it was severely chastised in the criminal case.
60 Paragraph nine of the Judgment on Mandate against Aluminum Com-
pany of America entered April 23, 1946, S.D.N.Y. Civ. No. 85-73, provided
that Alcoa was enjoined from:
"1 .... selling aluminum ingot for the fabrication of aluminum
sheet or aluminum alloy sheet at higher than fair prices, if the fab-
ricator of such sheet is thereby prevented from fabricating and
selling aluminum sheet or aluminum alloy sheet at a reasonable
.profit, provided that such fabricator is efficient, well equipped, and
otherwise able to fabricate and sell such sheet on a fully competitive
basis; and further enjoined and restrained from selling aluminum
sheet and aluminum alloy sheet, both coiled and flat, at prices be-
low its selling prices for aluminum ingot, plus the cost of manu-
facturing and selling such sheet... !'
This order has its curious facet also. It might make it difficult for Alcoa not
to discuss its ingot and sheet prices with competitors in order to comply
with the decree. Such conduct could be a per se violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co, 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
Query as to what protection the decree affords Alcoa in this respect?
61 For history of case, see note 64, infra.
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tailers on direct sales. Its wholesale customers sold, in part,
to other retailers at prices lower than those of Standard to
its retailers and, in part, through their own retail facilities
to consumers at prices lower than those charged the re-
tailers supplied directly by Standard. Standard's retail
customers complained.
The Federal Trade Commission faced a difficult choice
when this situation came to its attention. It had to choose
between two classes of competitors with divergent inter-
ests, i.e., wholesalers and retailers. It decided in favor of
the retailers and reached a conclusion which, ironically, is
just the reverse of that in Alcoa. It, in effect, compelled
Standard to apply an absolute squeeze to any wholesaler
which also sold as a retailer.
This is just the reverse of Alcoa because in that case
there were manufacturers of utensils, one step down the
aluminum fabricating line from the sheet manufacturers,
who complained both before and after Alcoa reduced the
price of ingot in 1933 that their competitors, who had inte-
grated sheet and utensil manufacturing, were able to
undersell the non-integrated -utensil manufacturer because
the spread between the ingot and sheet price set by Alcoa
was too large."2 The Alcoa decree, in effect, ordered this
squeeze continued.63
You are no doubt familiar with the long history of the
Standard of Indiana litigation." It started in 1940 and the
62 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F. Supp. 97, 213-14
(S.D. N.Y. 1941).
63 See note 69 supra.
64 FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, Docket No. 4389, Nov. 29, 1940.
After hearings a cease and desist order was issued in 1945, 41 F.T.C. 263
(1945), which the FTC modified in 1946, 43 F.T.C. 56 (1946). The order was
further modified and enforced by the 7th Circuit in 1949, 173 F.2d 210 (1949).
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the point of good faith meet-
ing of competition in -1951, 340 US. 231 (1951). The FTC issued its modi-
fied cease and desist order in 1953, 49 F.T.C. 923 (1953), and after a pro-
cedural setback in the 7th Circuit in 1954, 1954 Trade Cas. 67,727, its 1953
order was vacated and set aside by the 7th Circuit in May 1956, CCH
T"ADE REG. REP. 68,332.
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most recent round was won in May, 1956, by Standard,
when the Seventh Circuit upheld its defense of good faith
meeting of competition and vacated the FTC cease and
desist order. Most of the litigation in the courts has center-
ed on the good faith defense-a kind of confession and
avoidance. Therefore, the FTC order is otherwise as yet
unquestioned.
The complaint charged Standard with discrimination in
price in violation of section 2(a) of the Clayton Act as
amended, ..which unlike the original Clayton Act con-
tained no provision inferentially making functional dis-
counts lawful but left them to be tested like all other price
differentials by their effect upon competition. 6
The FTC's first order directed Standard not to sell any
gasoline to its wholesale customers for retail sale by them
at a price lower than Standard sold to its other retail
customers,6" and not to sell gasoline to its wholesale cus-
tomers for resale by them to retailers at a lower price than
Standard sold to its retailer customers if such wholesale
customers resold to retailers at a price less than Stand-
ard's price to retailers." The latter provision was modified
in 1946 to provide that Standard could not sell to its re-
tail customers at a higher price than its wholesale cus-
tomers sold to theirs.6 9
In other words, the FTC ordered Standard to put an
absolute squeeze on its integrated wholesale customers.
Such customers could perform the economic functions of
a wholesaler but to the extent they integrated into retailing
they had to buy as a retailer only, and at the same price
at which other retailers bought directly from Standard.
65 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (a) (1952).
66 See ATTORNEY GENERAL's NATIoNAL Cow irrrE TO STUaY THE AIM-
TRUST LAWS, RzPORT, at 202-208 (1955), for a full discussion of functional
discounts in relation to the Standard of Indiana case.
67 41 F.T.C. at 284. The order did not prevent "price differences of less
than 0.5 cents per gallon which do not tend to lessen, injure or destroy com-
petition with such dealers." But this was deleted in 1946, 43 F.T.C. 56 (1946).
68 41 F.T.C. at 285.
69 Modified Order, 43 F.T.C. 56, 58 (1946).
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Although the economic results of this may not make
much sense to economists, ° to lawyers,' or to Standard of
Indiana,7 2 the Attorney General's Committee assumed the
Commission's position reflected sound law." In other
words, in this type of situation a single price to all pur-
chasers regardless of differences in cost of selling or
function, while it may work economic discrimination,
gives rise to no discrimination legally actionable under
the Robinson Patman Act.74 Query, in view of Alcoa, as
to the Sherman Act?
70 See Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HAIv. L. REV. 27,
63-74 (1949); Dmruam & KAm, op. cit. supra note 36, at 245-253.
71 ATTOmRY GENERAL, op. cit. supra note 66, at 207-209.
72 Which wanted badly to keep the wholesalers' business and it ap-
parently has. It is reported that two of them have gone out of the retail
business. See Note, Functional Discounts Under The Robinson-Patman Act:
The Standard Oil Litigation, 67 HARv. L. REV. 294, 312-313 (1953).
73 ATTORNEy GENERAL, op. cit. supra note 71, at 206: "A seller's uniform
single price policy for all buyers irrespective of their functional status,
though constituting economic discrimination is not reachable as a price dis-
crimination by the Robinson-Patman Act. E.g. Bird and Son, Inc, 25 F.T.C.
548 (1937)." For a recent case see Klein v. Lionel Corp., 138 F. Supp. 560
(D. Del. 1956).
74 The cases seem to bear them out although the point seems never to
have been squarely presented to the Supreme Court. In three "delivered
price" (and, therefore, different) cases the Supreme Court seems to assume
that the Robinson Patman Act requires price differentials recognizing one
type of cost saving in selling to different purchasers--i.e., freight These are
different, according to ATTORNEY GENERAL, op. cit. supra note 66 at 217. As a
matter of fact:
"This obviously differs fr~om the denial to an integrated buyer
of functional discounts or 'brokerage' concessions, thereby depriving
him of returns on capital invested in the requisite distributive fa-
cilities. In the theoretical 'discrimination' arising from a 'delivered'
price which does not reward a customer's geographical proximity,
it cannot be assumed that he invested in a location near a particu-
lar supplier's mill in anticipation of a freight advantage. As a mat-
ter of fact, in view of the traditionally established 'delivered' pric-
ing in basic industries which doubtless enters into fabricators'
investment calculations for plant location, the opposite assumption
is equally plausible -entirely apart from the many other factors
attracting buyers of basic industrial goods to locate near consuming
markets."
The cases are:
FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948),
Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945), and
FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co, 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
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IV
A POSSIBLE NEW GOVERNMENTAL IMPLEMENT
FOR ATTACKING THE SQUEEZE- CONSIDERING
SUBSIDIARIES OR DIVISIONS AS PURCHASERS FOR
THE PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING A PRICE DIS-
CRIMINATION UNDER SECTION 2 (a) OF THE CLAY-
TON ACT, AS AMENDED
A recent case in the Eastern District of New York dealt
with a "squeeze" situation similar in principle to that in
Alcoa, in part, under section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act, and
in so doing appears to have put a somewhat novel con-
struction on that statute. This was Danko v. Shell Oil Co.75
decided in 1953.
One count of the complaint appears to have predicated
a cause of action on a difference in price in two "sales"
by Shell--one to its own retail service station and one to an
independent retail station selling in competition with the
the Shell retail station. The Shell service station was
allegedly selling at retail to consumers at a price lower than
the complaining retailer could match, thus squeezing that
retailer. Judge Bruchhausen overruled a motion to dis-
miss directed specifically to this count although he did
dismiss the complaint on other grounds but with leave to
file an amended complaint."
One of the fundamental requirements of section 2.(a) of
the Clayton Act, as amended, is that there be two sales.
This is clear from the face of the statute which makes it un-
lawful only ".... to discriminate in price between different
75 115 F. Supp. 886 (E.D.N.Y. 1953).
76 None was ever filed and the action was dismissed with prejudice by
stipulation. Danko v. Shell Oil Co., Civil No. 13638, E.D. N. Y, December
28, 1953.
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purchasers. ... ."' Mr. Justice Jackson said in one case:
... [No] single sale can violate the Robinson-Patman
Act. At least two transactions must take place in order to
constitute a discrimination.78
Was there a sale between Shell and its own retail
station? In order for a "sale" to occur, as that term is used
in the general legal sense, there must be a transfer of title
to goods from one legal person to another." Therefore,
if the retail station were a separate corporation from
Shell there might have been a "sale" as that term is gen-
erally understood in the law. If, on the other hand, the
retail station were merely another part of the Shell cor-
poration, there could not be a "sale" in the mere physical
transfer within the company, perhaps accompanied by a
bookkeeping entry.
Which was the situation in the Danco case is not clear
from the opinion. It does seem clear, however, that the
court considered it immaterial when it said:
The fact that defendant itself may own and control such
filling station would not destroy the relationship of ven-
dor and purchaser. In any event, it is doubtful that such
relationship if discriminatory, would be permitted to ac-
complish such objectivePse
77 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (a) (1952).
78 Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 755 (1947).
Another authority on the subject has put it this way: "There must be ac-
tual sales at different prices to at least two different actual purchasers."
AUSTIN, PRIcE DIsci nuxATioN AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNER THE ROBINSON
PATuAN AcT 38 (1950). Cf. Shaw's Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co, 105 F.2d 331
(3d Cir. 1939). See also, Sorrentino v. Glen-Gery Shale Brick Co, 46 F.
Supp. 709 (E. D. Pa. 1942), holding it is not a discrimination to refuse to sell
to one of two persons who have previously been customers thereby causing
one to lose business to the other.
79 " [A sale's] meaning in law is: '... contract whereby the absolute, or
general, ownership of property is transferred from one person to another
for a price or sum of money .... "' (Emphasis added). Beatty v. Santa Fe,
57 N.M. 759, 263 P.2d" 697, 701 (1953). "A sale is defined as a contract where-
by property is transferred from one person to another . . . implying the
passing of the general and absolute title.. . ." Cullen v. Tolley, 199 Okla. 214,
184 P.2d 797, 800 (1947).
80 115 F. Supp. at 888.
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If this be a holding that one department of a corporation
may be a "purchaser" from another department of the
same corporation within the meaning of section 2 (a) of
the Clayton Act, as amended, it would appear not only to
ignore a clear requirement of the statute, but also to do
violence to the basic structure and purpose of the act.8"
That portion of the Robinson Patman Act which be-
came section 2 of the Clayton Act was not drafted to cover
such a situation and this was clearly recognized by Con-
gress in passing it.
The point was raised in the course of testimony by the
author of the bill, Mr. Teegarden,"2 before the House
Judiciary Committee. Mr. Lloyd asked Teegarden:
It is a common practice in my country for large concerns
to buy at wholesale and maintain large stocks and, at the
81 The author has been unable to find any other case in which this point
seems squarely to have been raised and considered except possibly an infor-
mal early ruling by the Federal Trade Commission. A hat manufacturer
was charged in part with selling to subsidiary jobbers at prices which per-
mitted them to undersell competitor jobbers. The Commission ruling states
that "the subsidiary concerns and the manufacturing concern are merely
different corporate names for the same family.... The introduction of an-
other firm name into the process does not introduce an additional element
of competition, nor does it conceal the existence of the competition." The
file was closed. Informal Rulings of the Federal Trade Commission, 81
CoNG. REc. 2339 (1935). Cf., In re U.S. Steel Corp, 8 F.T.C. 1 (1924), in which
the Commission, without any apparent consideration of the question, in-
dicated that differences in prices to a group including subsidiaries on the
one hand, and to a different group on the other hand, resulted in com-
petitive advantage to the favored group. But it does not appear that this
was necessary to the finding of discrimination in price. See Sheehy, Impli-
cations of Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy IPoctrine in Clayton Act Sections
2 anad 3 Cases, A.B.A. REPORT, SEcTION OF ANTIRUST LAW 107 (April 1956).
82 Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary on HR. 8442, H.R.
4995, H.R. 5062, 74th Cong., 1st Seass., at 9 (1935). The bill which finally passed
was essentially H.R. 8442, which Mr. Teegarden was credited with drafting.
This, however, did not include what has become known as section 3 of the
Robinson Patman Act [Section 13a (not "(a)") of title 15, U.S. Code] which
was the Borah-Van Nuys Bill, S. 4171 and which has caused considerable
confusion. See Dillon, Criminal Penalties in Section 3 of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act (Borah-Van Nuys Act); "Dead Horse" or "Sleeper"?, A.B.A. i-
PORT, SECTIONOx ANTmIUST LAW 112 (April 1956).
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same time, maintain a retail department. In fact their re-
tail department is not segregated at all from their gen-
eral business. But the small retailer comes in there and
buys from them at "wholesale prices," so called....
How will this bill affect that situation where this concern
sells to itself for less than it sells to the independent re-
tailer?ss
After a further colloquy necessary to straighten Mr.
Teegarden out on precisely what the question was, he
answered:
There would be no question of discrimination pre-
sented as between itself and an independent retailer....
Because it is not a sale to itself. This only covers dis-
criminations in sales .... 8I
Later in his testimony when the same question was
raised again, Mr. Teegarden said:
... I do not believe this bill would reach it and off-
hand I doubt if it would be possible to reach it in this type
of legislation.s5
In other words, the amended section 2 (a) of the Clayton
Act was calculated to prevent a competitive evil by
striking at what were regarded as unfair financial con-
sequences to at least two different competitors flowing
directly from purchases or sales at different prices. Where,
for example, one of two retailers buying from the same
wholesaler, receives a lower price than the other, it is the
financial advantage gained by the one over the other flow-
ing directly from the difference in prices charged the two8"
which is the root of the harm to competition for the pur-
poses of this statute. Similarly, where a vendor sells in
one area at a lower price than in another to the detriment
of his competitors in the former area, it is the financial
advantage gained by such vendor flowing directly from
83 Hearings, supra note 82, at 211.
84 Ibid.
85 Id. at 229.
86 E.g., FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
the two sales at different prices which is the root of harm
to competition 7 under this statute.
Let us turn back now to the Danko case and assume first
that the Shell transfer of gasoline to its own retail station
was an intra-corporate transaction. It is difficult to see how
any financial advantage could have flowed to Shell directly
from the internal bookkeeping entry recording the trans-
fer. The total amount of money in Shell's till could not,
under any circumstances this writer can conjure, have
been affected one whit directly by this transaction re-
gardless of what figures were entered in the books.
Let us next assume that it was an inter-corporate trans-
fer from Shell to its wholly owned subsidiary - what
might for some purposes be regarded as a "sale" - a
transfer of title from one legal person to another. Should
the subsidiary be considered a "purchaser" within the
meaning of section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act? It is submitted
that it should not for the same reason stated above, unless
there is some most unusual circumstance present which
gives the Shell family a financial advantage over the
competitor-retailer flowing directly from the difference in
prices charged the subsidiary and such other retailer.
One might say there is a flaw in the logic of what has
just been stated. The proposition isn't really that the
subsidiary should not be considered a "purchaser," but
that no injury to competition should be inferred from the
mere fact of a lower price to the subsidiary, as it may be
from any difference in price charged by a seller to two
independent competitive resellers.8 8 Indeed, because such
circumstances would be so unusual, no complaint should
87 E.g., E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944).
88 Compare FTC v. Standard Brands, Inc., 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951),
with Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953). The Federal Trade
Commission has vacillated recently on this. Compare General Foods Co.,
F.T.C. Dkt. No. 5675 (April 27, 1954), with E. Edelmann and Co., F.T.C. Dkt.
5770 (May 10, 1955).
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be considered sufficient, absent specific allegations showing
financial advantage to the seller's family arising out of
these transactions. The shorthand and accurate way of
expressing this very complex idea is merely to say that the
subsidiary is not a "purchaser," because that label has no
necessary significance in terms of financial advantage, the
fulcrum on which the lever of section 2 (a) of the Clayton
Act turns.
Realistically, such economic harm as there was to
Danko for which Shell could be blamed stemmed from the
spread between Shell's price to Danko and Shell's retail
price. If Danko is to be given redress, it should be based
on that fact, either under the Sherman Act, as in Alcoa, or
under section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act as amended, under
the tests of such cases as Muller and Moss, which turned
on discriminations in retail prices adversely affecting
competitors of the seller.
The foregoing, however, is not to be taken as a necessar-
ily reliable prediction of how the law will be interpreted,
because, among other reasons, one group of very dis-
tinguished judges recently placed an interpretation upon
one of the antitrust laws in a converse situation which
prompted the following comment from an equally dis-
tinguished but less numerous group of judges:
Lack of sympathy with an Act of Congress does not
justify giving it a construction that cannot be rationalized
in terms of any policy reasonably attributable to Con-
gress.'. . . In this instance, I think the Court has depart-
ed from this rule by giving the Miller Tydings and
McGuire Acts an artificial construction which produces
results that could hardly be intended by Congress....
Indeed not even the fact that the only legislative history
directly in point is squarely opposed to the Court's read-
ing of the statute ... prompts enough doubt in the
Court to require an inquiry into the purpose of the Acts.8 9
89 Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, with Justices Frankfurter and Burton
in United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 316-318 (1956).
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The same zeal might be applied in placing an equally
artifical construction upon a statute with which the courts
are in sympathy to reach a result they think justified.
George A. BirretU*
" Member of the firm of Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine, New York,
New York.
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